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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Concurrently, in a matrimonial action, a court is empowered under
DRL 234 to determine questions concerning title to property and to
make appropriate directions concerning possession. This raises an
important question: When one party is awarded in a divorce decree
exclusive possession of realty previously held by both as tenants by
the entirety, is the other party precluded from obtaining partition?
Prior decisions on this point are in conflict. The Supreme Court,
Nassau County, held, in Pechstein v. Pechstein, 249 that an award of
exclusive possession does not bar an action for partition. 25 0 In Ripp v.
2 52
Ripp,25 ' however, the same court adopted the contrary view.

In Davies v. Davies,25 3 the Supreme Court, Monroe County, followed the Ripp case. The court viewed the property rights of the
former husband as subject to the divorce decree, under which the former wife received exclusive possession of the real property which
plaintiff sought to partition, and reasoned that allowance of an action
for partition would "defeat" that part of the decree which granted
exclusive possession to the former wife.254 Hence, it refused to circumvent the decree rendered under DRL 234.255
The decisions in Davies and in Ripp are consistent with the broad
discretionary power conferred upon the courts in DRL 234 and with
the literal interpretation of R.PAPL 901(1). The latter section permits
partition at the instance of a tenant in common in possession. If one
former spouse is granted exclusive possession of certain real property,
the other cannot be a tenant in common in possession of said property.
NEw Yom CiTy CmvL COURT AcT
CCA 202: Civil court can enforce foreign decree of support.
Under section 466(c) of the Family Court Act, the family court and
the supreme court are expressly granted original jurisdiction over
actions to enforce or to modify decrees by foreign courts of competent jurisdiction granting support or alimony. There is no mention
that this jurisdiction is exclusive, however, so the following issue has
been raised: Does section 466(c) deprive the civil court of jurisdiction
under CCA 202 to enforce a foreign decree of support?
249 64 Misc. 2d 969, 316 N.Y.S2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
250 Id. at 970, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 5; see Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 20 App. Div. 2d 71, 78,
245 N.Y.S.2d 395, 402 (Ist Dep't 1963).
25164 Misc. 2d 828, 314 N.YS.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
252 Id. at 324-25, 314 N.YS.2d at 463.
253 65 Misc. 2d 480, 318 N.YS.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971).
254 Id. at 482, 318 N.YS.2d at 99.
255 Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:147

In Slater v. Slater,256 plaintiff sought summary judgment in an
action to recover support payments directed in a Nevada divorce decree. The New York City Civil Court, New York County, held that it
had jurisdiction in the action subject to the monetary limitation upon
its judgments. 257 The basis of this conclusion was the absence of an
express statement of exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Family Court
258
Act.
CCA 1804: Substantialjustice mandate limited by rules of substantive
law.
Small-claims courts are mandated under CCA 1804 to render
"substantial justice between the parties according to rules of substantive law. . . ." While the court is bound by substantive law, however, it
is not restricted "by statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure,
pleading or evidence .... " This freedom of action expedites the smallclaims process and enables litigants to represent themselves before a
flexible forum.
An alleged exercise of this freedom by a small-claims court, in
Bierman v. City of New York, 259 was arrested by the Appellate Term of
the First Department, in Bierman v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York. 260 The appellate court held that the lower court's departure from
the traditional rules of negligence in adopting a rule of strict liability
without fault was error.261 Whether the rule of strict liability should
be adopted, the court noted, is a matter for determination by the Legislature or the Court of Appeals, not by courts of original jurisdiction.
For,
[S]tability and certainty in the law requires adherence to .
decisions of the Court of Appeals... by all lower courts. 262

.

. the

Mrs. Bierman had brought an action for $300 in compensation for
256 65 Misc. 2d 322, 317 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
257 Id. at 823, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 640.

258 Id. 317 N.Y.S.2d at 63!.
259 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 532, 584-85 (1970); 1970 Survey of New York
Law, 22 SYRAcusE L. R1Lv. 159-60 (1971).
260 66 Misc. 2d 237, 320 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1970).
261 Id. at 238, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
262 Id., citing Thomas v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 30 App. Div.2d 730, 731, 291 N.Y.S.2d
57, 58-59 (3d Dep't 1968); Brooks v. Horning, 27 App. Div. 2d 874, 875-76, 278 N.YS.2d
629, 632-34 (3d Dep't 1967); MacGilfrey v. Hotaling, 26 App. Div. 2d 977, 978, 274 N.Y.S.2d
850, 852 (3d Dep't 1966); Canter v. American Cyanamid Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 691, 692, 207
N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (3d Dep't 1960).

